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WHAT IS SO UNFAIR ABOUT USING GENETIC 
INFORMATION? THE PROBLEM OF GENETIC 
DISCRIMINATION
Introduction
New discoveries in human genetic technology have a signifi cant impact on 
society and open up new perspectives in medicine. Genetic information provides 
the ability to diagnose or predict genetic conditions for the risks of illness and 
may bring about signifi cant benefi ts to health care in the future. However, the 
use of genetic information poses daunting questions and great challenges to pub-
lic health care and our legal systems. One of the most demanding issues of the 
integration of new genetic technologies into medicine is the challenge of equality. 
The second biggest issue is the problem of the protection of patients’ autonomy 
and privacy in the age of genomic medicine, especially when genetic information 
can be used and misused for miscellaneous purposes. Both of the above men-
tioned concerns are based on a common social fear – the fear of genetic discrimi-
nation that has stimulated legislators of many countries to pass special laws 
guaranteeing genetic privacy or preventing people from genetic discrimination 
in such fi elds as the insurance system and employment. 
In the present essay I shall discuss some of the issues concerned with the 
problem of genetic discrimination. I shall present what genetic discrimination 
means and how it can manifest itself. I shall also discuss the main controversies 
that arise when the law preventing genetic discrimination is at stake. 
Genetic information, testing and screening 
One of the most fundamental problems concerning any laws restricting the 
use of genetic information is the lack of clear defi nitions of the terms involved. 
The International Declaration on Human Genetic Data adopted by UNESCO 
(United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization) on October 
16, 2003 gives the following defi nition of genetic information:
Information about heritable characteristics of individuals obtained by analysis of nu-
cleic acids or by other scientifi c analysis.
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To put it differently, it is information about specifi c variations in genes and 
chromosomes learned by genetic testing and other means. Such a broad defi ni-
tion concerns all kinds of information about our genes, including information 
about our health, as well as information about our identity, which can be also 
based on our family history and genealogy. Miscellaneous national, international 
or transnational legal acts defi ne the term differently with regard to special con-
text in which genetic information is used. Thus, one may distinguish defi nition of 
genetic information that are based on: (1) the mean of obtaining the information 
(resulted from genetic testing or screening of an individual; from family history; 
from test results of the relatives; from other information about an individual 
etc.); (2) the content of the information (information about our identity, informa-
tion about our health condition etc.); (3) the purpose of the use of the information 
(for identifi cation; for the body of evidence in a trial; for reproductive decisions; 
for treatment; for other social and life decisions etc.); (4) the predictive ability 
and predictive degree (which concerns especially genetic testing and screening 
for illness risk) etc.1        
In this essay which concerns the problem of genetic discrimination, I shall 
focus on genetic information about individual’s health status, especially the pre-
dictive aspect obtained from individual’s genetic tests, the genetic test of family 
members or family health history of such individual. 
The same problem of the ambiguity of terms occurs when we turn to the defi -
nition of genetic testing. A broad defi nition for genetic testing includes any test 
that yields genetic data, unambiguously revealing underlying DNA information, 
irrespective of its technological aspect. A narrower defi nition that can be used in 
the context of the paper says that “genetic testing refers to medical procedures 
that determine the presence or absence of a genetic disease, condition or marker 
in individual patients (Gostin). Genetic tests involve an examination of chromo-
somes, DNA, molecules, or gene products (such as proteins) to fi nd evidence of 
certain mutated sequences.”2 
Genetic testing should be distinguished from genetic screening.3 Testing is 
performed on individuals (especially who are at a higher risk of carrying a spe-
cifi c genetic mutation). Screening, by contrast, is performed on a wider group of 
people, a defi ned population (including those individuals who are at lower than 
average risk for carrying a specifi c genetic mutation). One can distinguish two 
especially important and well known kinds of genetic screening: newborn genetic 
screening, which enables newborns to be screened for a wide variety of genetic 
conditions (such as phenylketonuria, mucoviscidosis and hypothyroidism) and 
population screening performed at the population level, especially when the par-
ticular population is at higher risk than average to suffer a genetic disease (e.g. 
Ashkenazi Jews are especially threatened by the disease, having a 1 in 30 chance 
1  See A. Krajewska, Informacja genetyczna a zakres autonomii jednostki w europejskiej 
przestrzeni prawnej (Genetic Information and the Scope of Individual Autonomy in the European 
Legal Space), Wrocław 2008, pp. 46–58. 
2  J.G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Testing and Screening [in:] S.G. Post (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bio-
ethics, vol. 2, MacMillan Reference Books, 2003, p. 1016.
3  More on various kinds of genetic testing and screening in: M.J. Mehlman, J.R. Botkin, 
Access to the Genome: The Challenge to Equality, Washington 1998, pp. 20–38.
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of carrying the gene for Tay-Sachs, African Americans have a 1 in 11 chance of 
being gene carriers for sickle cell disease, and thalassemias is prevalent among 
Southeast Asians). 
Among genetic testing (or screening) for inherited conditions for illness one 
can distinguish: diagnostic genetic testing (they confi rm diagnosis for a symp-
tomatic individual); predictive genetic testing (that are aimed at determination 
of future illness risk in asymptomatic patients) and  pharmacogentic testing 
which seeks to promote a favourable response and to prevent an adverse re-
sponse to a drug or other treatment based on a genetic predisposition. 
Predictive genetic testing for inherited genetic disease risks is one of the most 
promising branches of genomic medicine. It is intended to identify patients’ con-
ditions of risk for future illnesses. Genetic testing can identify conditions that 
enable specifi c treatments or preventive measures to be taken, as well as condi-
tions for which there is no treatment or preventive measure available. In the 
latter cases, genetic testing provide information that can be used by patients to 
make important life decisions and signifi cant reproductive choices.
Depending on the purpose of the application of predictive genetic testing, one 
can distinguish: (1) predictive genetic testing to assess reproductive risks; (2) 
predictive genetic testing to assess future disease risks in healthy adults. 
Reproductive genetic testing or screening includes: (1a) preconception testing 
(carrier testing of adults) to identify if a patient is a carrier of a recessive dis-
ease gene that can be passed on to successive generations; (1b) prenatal testing 
(of foetal cells) to identify all potential future abnormalities of a child; (1c) pre-
implantation testing (of embryos) to identify conditions of an embryo formed by 
in-vitro fertilization.  
Predictive genetic testing to assess future disease risks in healthy adults are 
late-onset conditions tests that can vary in their predictive ability. With regard 
to the predictive degree one can distinguish among: (2a) pre-symptomatic ge-
netic testing that determine the eventual development of symptoms with almost 
100 percent certainty when the gene mutation is present (e.g. Huntington dis-
ease); and (2b) pre-dispositional genetic testing (susceptibility testing) that the 
eventual development of symptoms is likely but not certain when the gene mu-
tation is present (e.g. breast and ovarian cancer, testing is based on prognostic 
markers such as BRCA1 and BRCA2).
Use of genetic information 
In the vast literature about genetic testing and screening there is a frequent-
ly given distinction between (1) medical and (2) non-medical purposes of the 
use of genetic information. Among the medical purposes of using genetic infor-
mation, one usually names: (1a) preventing the onset of diseases; (1b) assuring 
that early detection and treatment (treatment can be also based on the so-called 
pharmacogenetic tests); (1c) making genetic-based reproductive decisions; (1d) 
making life plan decisions (about special diet, about conduct, lifestyle etc.). As 
far as the use of genetic information for non-medical purposes is concerned, one 
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usually names: (2a) using genetic information by insurance companies in group 
health plans (as a basis for denying coverage if a person does not currently have 
a disease); (2b) using genetic information by employers in group health plans 
(as a basis for refusing to offer health coverage as part of the benefi ts); (2c) us-
ing results of genetic tests to give or refuse employment; (2d) using results of 
genetic tests in education system; (2e) using results of genetic tests in adoption 
procedures etc. Given such a distinction there are many who claim that discrimi-
nation may manifest itself only as far as the non-medical purposes of the use 
of genetic information are concerned. In my further considerations I shall chal-
lenge this statement by undermining the distinction. 
It is not clear what we mean by medical purposes.4 Firstly, there are some 
who defi ne medical purposes as those concerned with a diagnosis or prediction 
of a specifi c illness, yet not concerned with specifying any general characteristics 
such as susceptibility for obesity or alcoholism. One can pose the question about 
the defi nition of an illness and discuss which characteristics can be understood 
as conditions for illnesses. The answer is not easy as far as the defi nition of ill-
ness depends on what a society specifi es as the dysfunction of an organism ac-
cording to some measures of the “normal” function of a human organism. The 
further question is how can we specify the role of the internal (genetic) and ex-
ternal (social connected with our behaviour) factors in the onset of a disease. 
Secondly, one can also argue that medical purposes should be understood as 
those that aim at the treatment of a certain disease when the gene mutation is 
present. However, it would signifi cantly restrict the scope of the use of genetic 
information in health care since our predictive ability in medicine is not on a par 
with effective medical care to enable the prevention of a potential disease. There 
are many late-onset illnesses that can be predicted by genetic testing yet cannot 
be healed. The information about the condition for future illness risk can help in 
preventing or postponing the onset of the disease by undertaking an appropri-
ate diet, physical exercises or lifestyle. What is more, such information can help 
in preparing people mentally for an illness. Finally, such information can affect 
the reproductive decisions of an individual and prevent them from passing on 
the disease to her descendants. As far as reproductive decisions are concerned, 
there are deep controversies that pose a myriad of questions, especially when 
decisions based on genetic information are aimed at the selection of embryos or 
at abortion. 
Thirdly, one can assume that medical purposes are those concerned with a di-
agnosis or prediction of a specifi c illness which is a mental or psychical dysfunc-
tion of an organism that should be treated (even if no treatment is available yet). 
However, such a defi nition of medical purposes do not determine what kind of 
decisions individuals would make on the basis of genetic information about the 
dysfunction of a human organism. For instance, it is still unclear whether repro-
ductive decisions for eugenic reasons (selection of embryos or selective abortion) 
could be understood as the use of genetic information for medical purposes even 
when in such cases it is not the elimination of a dysfunction (the condition for 
disease) but rather the elimination of the subjects (possible people) with a dys-
4  See A. Krajewska, op.cit., pp. 189–191.
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function is at stake. Actually, any genetic testing or screening is, according to the 
above mentioned defi nition, performed for medical purposes – for the diagnosis 
or prediction of an illness. The difference consists in for what such information is 
used. In other words, such a defi nition of medical purposes is useless and makes 
the whole distinction between medical and non-medical purposes questionable.
Since it is very diffi cult to specify a clear defi nition of medical purposes, 
perhaps it would be better to distinguish between genetic information used for 
health purposes from genetic information used for all other purposes. By health 
purposes I mean those concerned with promoting health (improving health con-
dition) and challenging illness of individuals. But such a defi nition depends on 
another unclear notion – health. According to a very broad and frequently object-
ed defi nition given by the World Health Organization (WHO), health is a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infi rmity.5 On the basis of such a defi nition of health, every kind of use 
of genetic information could be understood as the use for health purposes if only 
it could affect our well-being which is a very vague concept. One can also assume 
a narrower defi nition where health is understood as a lack of illness and illness 
is specifi ed as a mental or psychical dysfunction of an organism that should be 
treated. Such a defi nition of an illness consists of a descriptive (dysfunction is 
specifi ed by frequency of appearance of a feature) and a normative (some kinds 
of deviation are tolerated and some are seen as dysfunctions that ought to be 
treated) element. This defi nition is open for any content that would meet both 
descriptive and normative conditions and can evolve within societies.  
Nevertheless, the distinction between the use of genetic test results for health 
purposes and for all other purposes is neither disjunctive nor comprehensive. For 
instance, the use of genetic information which results in refusing employment 
can be aimed at the protection of the health of the person when the conditions 
of work would increase the risk of the ouset of a disease. Reproductive genetic 
testing can be also aimed at either elimination of a dysfunction of an embryo of 
the elimination of an embryo. Everything depends on the context of the use of 
genetic information, not on the kind of testing or the information itself.
What is genetic discrimination? 
Before I turn to an analysis of genetic discrimination I shall specify what 
I mean by the term “discrimination.” The problem of discrimination is tightly 
connected with the concept of justice since as discrimination we can understand 
a special kind of injustice. Every discrimination is injustice but not every in-
justice must manifest itself in a form of discrimination. To make it more clear, 
5  Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the In-
ternational Health Conference, New York, 19–22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the 
representatives of 61 States (Offi cial Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) 
and entered into force on 7 April 1948.
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let me briefl y introduce the concept of justice.6 One should distinguish between 
the formal and substantive levels of justice. Formal justice requires that equal 
people are to be treated equally or that like cases are to be treated alike and dif-
ferent cases are to be treated differently. Everything depends on what we mean 
by equal and not equal, i.e. how we differentiate between people. The rule of 
equal treatment is empty, there is no content since the criteria of differentiation 
as well as its aims come from the substantive level of justice which must comple-
ment the formal level to make a concept of justice full-fl edged. The formal level 
of justice is aimed at guaranteeing its impartiality and consistency – it requires 
one to obey the adopted criteria of justice. The substantive level of justice, on 
the other hand, can be defi ned as principles of distribution of goods (broadly un-
derstood, they include rights and duties, wealth and income, positions and jobs, 
rewards and punishments etc.) among people according to particular criteria. 
Nevertheless, such a criteria of the differentiation of people cannot be arbitrary 
and have to be justifi ed. The underlying differences between individuals that 
justify the criteria of distribution which results in differences in their treatment 
must be differences relevant to the aim of distribution. Even when the same 
people are treated in the same way (the condition of formal justice is satisfi ed), 
there can be injustice when we question either the aim of distribution or the 
criteria of differentiation. 
In short, by discrimination one may understand a situation when individuals 
who are alike in every relevant respect (not in absolutely every respect) are treat-
ed differently, or when individuals who are different in some relevant respect are 
treated alike.7 Direct discrimination takes place when discrimination is based 
on unjustifi ed criteria of different treatment. Indirect discrimination takes place 
when although different treatment is based on neutral criteria, it brings about 
unjustifi ed exclusion of  particular individuals or groups of people that are un-
able to meet such criteria. In other words, indirect discrimination concerns all 
situations when a defi nition of an aim of distribution or a defi nition of a par-
ticular social institution is unjustifi ed. Thus, discussing discrimination, one has 
always to consider whether there is justifi cation of a difference in treatment. 
By genetic discrimination one usually understands: “Actions taken against or 
negative attitudes toward a person based on that person’s possession of variation 
on the genome, or variations in the genome of his or her biological relatives.”8 To 
put it differently, genetic discrimination means that one’s own genetic character-
istics are unjustifi ed criteria of a difference in treatment or are wrongly included 
in an aim of a distribution or a defi nition of an institution. One can argue that 
a number of differential treatments are based on inherited genetic characteris-
tics (e.g. rewarding individual merits and punishing individual vices – taking 
any decisions on our inherited characteristics such intelligence, talent, appear-
ance, inclinations). But discrimination occurs only if differential treatment is 
6  To read more about it see: M. Soniewicka, Granice sprawiedliwości, sprawiedliwość ponad 
granicami (Boundaries of Justice, Justice Beyond Boundaries), Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 
2010, pp. 40–61.
7  J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy, Foundations of Philosophy Series, E. and M. Beardsley 
(eds.), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1973, p. 99.
8  P.G. Epps, Genetic Discrimination [in:] Encyclopedia of Bioethics, vol. 2, p. 956.
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unjustifi ed, i.e. criteria are irrelevant with regard to the aim of distribution of 
rewards and punishments or an aim of distribution or a defi nition of an institu-
tion are wrong.  
How may genetic discrimination manifest itself?
The consequences of the use of genetic information for health and other pur-
poses may bring about both indirect and direct discrimination that manifests 
itself in several ways. First of all, one should consider indirect discrimination of 
the genetically least advantaged that can result from unequal access to health 
resources. New advanced technologies applied to medicine give people greater 
opportunities of enhancement than were ever known before but these new ge-
netic technologies are not available to a broad segment of the population. Quite 
the contrary, access to genetic technology and genetic information is expensive 
and restricted to some of the most advantaged individuals in highly developed 
nations. Thus, exclusive genomic medicine gives rise to new challenges in the 
fair distribution of health care resources within and among nations. Of course, 
we do not have to draw any futuristic vision to understand the problem. We are 
all facing the problem right now in our current world. Over 50% of the causes of 
mortality in developing countries are completely curable in high-income coun-
tries.9 Sometimes it is only a matter of vaccines that cost 20 cents each or even 
just a matter of anti-mosquito nets (one of the treatments against malaria). One 
cannot expect neither a similar quantity nor quality of life among all the in-
habitants of our world. Today someone living in Zambia has less of a chance of 
reaching the age of 30 than someone born in England in 1840; somebody born 
in Burkina Faso can expect to live 35 years fewer than somebody born in Japan, 
and somebody born in India can expect to live 14 years fewer than somebody 
born in the USA. The unequal distribution of health resources results in indirect 
discrimination since people who are deprived of basic health care have no access 
to all other basic goods in a society. Genomic medicine is another step in medical 
advances that can either broaden the gap between the least advantaged and the 
most advantaged inhabitants of the world or narrow the gap and, since genomic 
medicine is based on the newest and most expansive technology, it is more prob-
able that it will broaden the gap.10 This is the problem of national and global 
distributive justice that occurs in a new challenging perspective and cannot be 
solved by itself. It requires global and national initiatives in public health policy 
9  Human Development Report 2005, pp. 3–25, http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/. 
10  See current data on the problem of equity in medical services based on genetics: D.C. 
Wertz, J.C. Fletcher, Genetics and Ethics in Global Perspective, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2004, pp. 14–18; A. Krajewska, op.cit., pp. 206–212. About the problem of justice in the age of 
genetics see: A. Buchanan, D.W. Brock, N. Daniels, D. Wikler, From Chance to Choice: Genetics 
and Justice, Cambridge University Press, 2007, passim. See also the fi rst article of this volume 
– G.J. Annas, The Genomics Revolution in the Shadow of Auschwitz: Eugenics, Genism, and 
Genetic Genocide.
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that will combat new social divisions based on health status and health care op-
portunities.  
Secondly, one should consider the direct discrimination of the genetically 
least advantaged that can be manifested in eugenic decisions and that can bring 
about changes for human species that could undermine the whole concept of 
justice. Eugenics is the term invented by Francis Galton, the cousin of Charles 
Darwin. The term comes from Greeks, where eugenés means “well-born,” which 
is meant as hereditary endowed with good genetic qualities. The main aim of 
eugenics consists of the improvement of the human race or simply producing the 
best possible children. Eugenics may manifest itself in birth control aimed at 
“encouraging” the procreation of “fi tter people” and “discouraging unfi t people” 
from procreatrion. It may also manifest itself in the improvement of human na-
ture by the manipulation of a genotype, where human abilities are quite restrict-
ed so far. Eugenic state policies that were rooted in social Darwinism of the late 
19th century were largely discredited in the 20th century. However, the idea of eu-
genics itself has not been discredited yet. Quite the contrary, it is deeply rooted 
in people’s minds and still present in social practices. Now, in the beginning of 
the 21st century, state eugenics is being replaced by private eugenics. It means 
that procreative decisions based on genetic information can be taken but only by 
individuals, not by the state or doctors who can neither force nor suggest them. 
By contrast to former authoritarian eugenics, we are now faced with liberal eu-
genics as Jürgen Habermas points out.11 This liberal eugenics seems justifi ed 
since it is natural for people to crave the best possible for their children or at 
least for having healthy children. Nevertheless, there is much concern about the 
whole idea of producing “better babies” that may bring about stigmatization and 
direct discrimination of “defected” human beings.12 What is more, “improving 
humans” may create in the future a division between super-humans (improved 
ones) and sub-humans (not improved) that would be two separate species, called 
by Lee Silver the “GenRich” and the naturals.13 If such a division appeared, the 
notion “justice” would be useless since one of the necessary conditions of justice 
is approximate equality in natural powers between and among human beings. If 
there would be a human race biologically endowed with such power that would 
11  J. Habermas, Przyszłość natury ludzkiej. Czy zmierzamy do eugeniki liberalnej? (Die 
Zukunft der menschlichen Natur. Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen Eugenik?), M. Łukasiewicz 
(trans.), Warszawa 2003, passim, especially pp. 26 ff. About the idea of eugenics, positive and 
negative genetic interventions see: A. Buchanan, D.W. Brock, N. Daniels, D. Wikler, op.cit., 
passim. See also the fi rst article of this volume – G. Annas, The Genomics Revolution in the 
Shadow of Auschwitz: Eugenics, Genism, and Genetic Genocide.
12  About the problem of genetic discrimination resulted from the use of prenatal and pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis see A. Krajewska, op.cit., pp. 241 ff. 
13  L. Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World, Free Press, New 
York 1985, pp. 110–111. I quote after G.J. Annas, American Bioethics. Crossing Human Rights 
and Health Law Boundaries, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 50. Such a situation was vividly 
illustrated by the famous science-fi ction movie Gattaca (1997) directed by Andrew Niccol with 
Uma Thurman and Ethan Hawke.
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enable them to dominate permanently other races, justice would be impossible 
as David Hume writes.14
The whole idea of taking control over human evolution poses signifi cant ques-
tions concerned with such notions as “better” or “improvement” with regard to 
a human being.15 Such normative notions can be understood in different ways 
and we could never be sure if we are right about what would be better for our 
descendants or what kind of improvement future generations would require. As 
I mentioned before, it is very diffi cult to specify such notions as health, illness 
or even dysfunction of an organism since all of them require a concept of a norm 
which is defi ned in a context of a society. For instance, homosexuality was listed 
as a mental illness by the WHO’s International Classifi cation of Diseases (ICD) 
until 1990. Being different than most people does not have to be treated as hav-
ing disorder. Even though most people agree that dwarfi sm or being deaf and 
dumb are dysfunctional abnormalities of the human organism, some people who 
are born with such features use pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to 
guarantee that their children will be the same as they are. Of course, this is an 
exception which stays at odds with the general eugenic idea, but it shows us that 
there can be no consensus about justifi ed reproductive decisions based on genetic 
information.     
Last but not least, one should consider all situations in which the genetically 
least advantaged can be discriminated against (directly or indirectly) as far as 
their social status and private relations, insurance, employment, education etc. 
are concerned. Especially worthy of attention are situations in which individuals 
are treated differently with regard to the information about symptoms of a dis-
ease that they may develop in the future. Let me present some examples of such 
situations that pose many ethical and legal questions.16  
It may happen that people who are apparently healthy, asymptomatic in-
dividuals undergo genetic testing that detects their future illness risk. Some 
insurers deny coverage or raise the premiums of those asymptomatic individuals 
who are at risk of an illness. It means that people with a gene for a condition are 
treated on a par with people who have the condition. It may also happen that 
people who were diagnosed as having the condition undertake special treatment 
and prevent the onset of disease. Nevertheless, some companies deny them in-
surance, treating them on a par with people who develop the symptoms of a dis-
ease. It may also happen that the genetic testing or screening diagnose an illness 
which can be healed or reveal a predisposition or susceptibility for a disease that 
can be prevented by special treatment but the insurer denies the coverage and 
one cannot afford the special treatment or cures that are available. Thus, if one 
14  D. Hume, Badania dotyczące zasad moralności (An Enquiry Concerning the Principles 
of Morals), Kraków 2005, p. 21.
15  G.J. Annas presents deep skepticism about genetic engineering and “enhancement” of 
human race that can bring about genetic genocide (G.J. Annas, American Bioethics..., pp. 35 ff.). 
See also the fi rst chapter of this volume – G.J. Annas, The Genomics Revolution in the Shadow 
of Auschwitz: Eugenics, Genism, and Genetic Genocide.
16  All examples are created by an analogy to real situations described in an article by P.R. 
Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, “The American Journal for 
Human Genetics” 1992, vol. 50, pp. 476–482.
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does not perform the genetic test, one will not know about the disease and one 
will not heal or prevent it. If one does perform the test, one has no insurance to 
cover the treatment or cure. The fi rst situation is better than the latter, but both 
are worse than the possible promise of treatment or cure based on genetic test 
results. Of course, analyzing the problem of the use of genetic information in the 
insurance system, we have to take into account all the differences between coun-
tries and, since the health insurance system in Europe and Canada, in contrast 
to the U.S., provides universal access to health resources, the problem of genetic 
discrimination may manifest itself only as far as life insurance is concerned. 
Thus, if we discuss the problem within European context, the possible scope of 
discrimination would be limited.
It may also happen that employers use the genetic tests results included in an 
employee’s medical record in group health plans as a basis for refusing to offer 
health coverage as part of their benefi ts. Employers may also use the results of 
genetic tests to take such decisions as: promotion, hiring or fi ring etc. An employ-
er may want to avoid additional costs that individuals at risk of a disease may 
produce (health insurance costs, absence in work, lower fl exibility, danger – for 
instance when it is a job of a driver or of a pilot etc.) and to guarantee the highest 
possible effi ciency by giving the job for the most prospective effi cient workers. 
What is more, an adoption agency may seek to fi nd the best possible parents 
for children and to reject adoption by people who are at risk of future illnesses. 
For instance, a couple who is at risk of developing Huntington disease do not 
want to have their own children since they do not want to pass the Huntington 
genes to the children. They decide to adopt a child but are rejected by an adop-
tion agency although the fi rst symptoms of the disease usually occur when peo-
ple are around 50. 
Other controversies may arise, when a person who has a driving license for 
twenty years and has never had any accidents or traffi c violations is denied by 
the automobile insurance company of having car insurance on the basis of ge-
netic test results that detect a genetic disorder in the driver. 
All these hypothetical situations have already happened at least once in the 
USA and have brought about a fear of genetic discrimination which is mani-
fested in a rejection of performing genetic testing and screening by many indi-
viduals. One can go one step further and imagine situations in other spheres 
of human life when similar discrimination may occur. For instance, the use of 
genetic information in relation to education may occur when people with inher-
ited genetic predispositions or susceptibility for a disease are refused access to 
a particular school because of the information about their future illness risk 
or are treated differently in school on the basis of their genetic inheritance.17 
However, statistic research show that people generally distrust insurance com-
panies or employers but trust the education system. Most of the people who took 
part in a global survey on genetic discrimination would not want to disclose their 
genetic test results to insurers or employers (if their health insurance depends 
17  See L.F. Rothstein, Genetic Information in Schools [in:] M.A. Rothstein, Genetic Secrets: 
Protecting Privacy and Confi dentiality in the Genetic Era, Yale University Press, New Haven 
and London 1997, pp. 317–331.
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on their employment), but they would want to disclose the genetic test results of 
their children to a school system to guarantee them the most appropriate educa-
tion and treatment.18       
Therefore, it is quite obvious that so far only discrimination in the dimension 
of insurance system has gained special attention, refl ected in numerous legal 
acts that responded to the problem or the fear of the problem. The use of genetic 
information in relation to employment or education is very rare but the situation 
can be changed. In my further considerations I shall analyze the main contro-
versies concerned with the prohibition of genetic discrimination in the example 
of laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in insurance which is the deepest con-
cern of legislators around the world.    
Laws prohibiting genetic discrimination 
Genetic discrimination is forbidden in general by many international dec-
larations and conventions. According to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application 
of Biology and Medicine (otherwise known as the Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine, or the Oviedo Convention),19 all should have equitable access 
to health care resources (Art. 3) and any form of discrimination against a person 
on grounds of his or her genetic heritage is prohibited (Art. 11). What is more, 
any predictive genetic tests may be performed for health purposes only (Art. 
12). According to the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights:20 everyone’s dignity and rights should be respected regardless of their 
genetic characteristics (Art. 2, sect. 2) and no one shall be a subject of discrimina-
tion on the basis of his or her genetic characteristics (Art. 6). Also the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaims that any discrimination 
based on genetic features shall be prohibited (Art. 21).21 
What is more, the European Parliament stated that insurers neither have the 
right to require genetic testing as a condition for insurance nor to be informed 
about the results of genetic testing performed by the applicants. Some European 
countries followed the declaration of the European Parliament and prohibited 
the use of genetic information by insurers. In several countries insurance compa-
nies agreed upon a voluntary moratoria on the use of genetic information.
Countries that decided to regulate the use of genetic information in the fi eld 
of insurance adopted either special non-discrimination and privacy acts or spe-
cial rules within their existing regulations. The former model of regulation can 
18  See D.C. Wertz, J.C. Fletcher, op.cit., pp. 63–74.
19  Drafted by the Council of Europe and entered into force on December, 1 1999.
20  Drafted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1997 and endorsed by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1998.
21  Drafted by the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Eu-
ropean Commission on December 7, 2000, adopted into the Treaty of Lisbon and entered into 
force on December 1, 2009.
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be illustrated by the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) passed 
by the House of Representatives and signed by President George Bush on May 
21, 2008. According to the act, group health plans and health insurers are pro-
hibited from denying coverage to a healthy individual or charging that person 
higher premiums based solely on a genetic predisposition to developing a disease 
in the future. The legislation also bars employers from using individuals’ genetic 
information when making hiring, fi ring, job placement, or promotion decisions. 
The latter model of adopting special rules within other regulations can be il-
lustrated by the Polish insurance law (Insurance Activity Act of May 22, 2003. 
However, the Polish law is not very restrictive in this matter and Polish labour 
law does not include explicitly any prohibitions of discrimination based on ge-
netic characteristics. According to the Article 21 and 22 of the Insurance Activity 
Act, insurance company can require from an individual medical examination or 
diagnostic examination, with the exception of genetic testing, in order to estimate 
the insurance risk and specify rights to service and the level of premium. While 
GINA puts main stress on the fact of the use of genetic information in insurance, 
Polish law pays attention to the requirement of genetic testing, while omits the 
problem of taking decisions based on genetic information. Thus, GINA offers 
much broader protection of patient’s rights since it forbids the use of genetic 
information (about a genetic predisposition to developing a disease) irrespective 
of how and from who the insurer obtained them. For instance, an insurance com-
pany could conduct tests themselves, could gain access to the medical records of 
an applicant that include genetic test results or could require from an applicant 
some specifi c genetic testing.
Actually, we can distinguish three main models of legal restrictions on the 
use of genetic information by insurers. The fi rst one is aimed at the restriction 
of genetic information, whereas the second is aimed at restricting the manage-
ment of information and the third at avoiding harm as far as the use of genetic 
information is concerned. The third model seems to be the most adequate when 
we consider the question of challenging genetic discrimination. However, it is 
not obvious how such aim could be effi ciently guaranteed by legal regulations, 
especially if there is no consensus about genetic discrimination itself.        
Some arguments against the prohibition of genetic discrimination
Taking under consideration the problem of discrimination in the dimension 
of insurance, we have to analyze whether genetic information is irrelevant or 
not as regards the criteria of different treatment of applicants. Insurers object 
to the prohibition of the use of genetic information in their procedures for many 
reasons. They argue that genetic information cannot be distinguished from other 
medical information about health status or condition of an individual that are 
the core basis of insurance system. What is more, the prohibition of the use of 
genetic information by insurers would privilege some applicants and bring about 
the so called adverse selection making the distribution of insurance deeply un-
fair, so the argument goes. Let me present the main arguments briefl y.     
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1. Genetic information as a part of medical data 
One can argue that genetic test results are a part of personal health records 
that cannot be isolated or distinguished. If the insurers may obtain and use 
other personal medical data, including family health care history, it remains 
quite unclear why they are prohibited from using genetic test results, so the 
argument goes. The insurance system was always based on personal health in-
formation that helped to estimate the future risk of a individual to an onset of 
disease. Such information was always the basis for specifying the premium of an 
individual as well as deciding about the coverage. Companies gather personal 
health information, including age, health care history, and family health care 
history, in underwriting individual insurance policies. They use statistical corre-
lation of this data with future ill health to predict whether they result in claims 
for payment under an insurance policy. Furthermore, the insurance companies 
establish their policy terms, as well as premium amounts, on the basis of such 
predictions. If the estimated risk is too great or unpredictable, which means that 
it can bring more costs than benefi ts, the companies used to refuse coverage. 
2. Adverse selection
What is more, insurers usually invoke the so called “adverse selection” as the 
crucial argument that prohibition of the use of genetic information by insurers 
would be unfair. If applicants for individual insurance coverage have undergone 
genetic testing and had no obligation to disclose the results to the insurance 
companies, they would be the privileged side. People with positive test results 
would buy the coverage and those with negative would not. Taking into account 
that all individuals were to be charged the same premium and offered the same 
coverage irrespective of their personal information, those applicants who were 
at the lowest risk would desert the insurance companies and there would remain 
only those at the highest risk who would generate inadequately high costs for 
the companies.22 That would result in increasing premiums or the collapse of the 
system of insurance. Therefore, insurers argue that they should have the right 
to either require or at least to obtain and use the genetic test results of their ap-
plicants.
Some arguments for the prohibition of genetic discrimination
New regulatory regimes that meet the problems of the use of genetic infor-
mation by insurance companies demonstrate quite the opposite view. The non-
discrimination or privacy laws that provide double standard of protection with 
22  R.M. Berry, Health Care and the Human Genome. Regulatory Challenge and Response 
[in:] A.S. Iltis, S.H. Johnson and B.A. Hinze (eds.), Legal Perspectives in Bioethics, Routledge, 
New York, London 2008, p. 98.
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regard to genetic information distinguish them from other medical or personal 
information. The distinction and the special protection are grounded on the ar-
gument of genetic exeptionalism. 
1. Genetic exceptionalism
Sensitive data is that which requires special protection because of their na-
ture. According to The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of the Council of Europe of 1981, 
sensitive data includes information about race and ethnical origins, political 
opinions, religious beliefs or sexual life and orientation. There are some who 
argue that genetic information should be included in the list of sensitive data. 
As George Annas, Leonard Glantz and Patricia Roche write: “Genetic informa-
tion is uniquely powerful and uniquely personal, and thus merits unique privacy 
protection.”23 Statements such as genetic information is unique, exceptionally 
sensitive and therefore requires wider and separate protection from other health 
related medical records is called genetic exceptionalism.24 Genetic exceptional-
ism consists of both a descriptive and a normative assumption. The descriptive 
one is that genetic information are distinctive and can be distinguished from 
other medical information while the normative is that they ought to be specially 
protected. 
First of all, genetic information can be seen as highly sensitive and unique 
because of its special predictive character. It not only describes people’s health 
in the past and present, but they may predict people’s future health, detect-
ing a predisposition or susceptibility for illness in healthy asymptomatic indi-
viduals. Thus, George Annas calls individuals’ genotype profi les their “future 
diaries.”25 Secondly, genetic information provides much more personal informa-
tion than medical data, not only information about individual’s health status, 
but also about many other signifi cant personal characteristics. It enables the 
identifi cation of an individual. This is why genetic information can be protected 
in two legal regimes – of personal data and of medical data. Thirdly, genetic 
information is unique and highly sensitive since it reveals information not only 
about an individual but also about an individual’s family (ancestors, siblings 
as well as current or future offspring). It poses questions about the limits of 
individual autonomy and the need for the special protection of people’s privacy. 
Fourthly, genetic information exists beyond our control and cannot be changed 
by our actions or decisions. Thus, it seems that our genes refl ect our fate that 
we do not chose and cannot change. Finally, genetic information is very easy to 
obtain without consent or even the knowledge of an individual. For instance, one 
23  G. Annas, L. Glantz, P. Roche, Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science, Policy and 
Practical Considerations, “Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics” 1995, vol. 23, p. 360.
24  See J.G. Hodge, Jr., op.cit., pp. 1019–1020; T.H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and 
“Future Diaries”: Is Genetic Information Different from Other Medical Information? [in:] M.A. 
Rothstein, op.cit., pp. 60–73; A. Krajewska, op.cit., pp. 59–66.
25  G.J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded ‘Future Diaries’, “Journal 
of the American Association” 1993, vol. 270, pp. 2346–2350.
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can perform genetic testing on a tiny genetic material included in somebody’s 
saliva left on a cup of coffee or on a licked envelope.  
Although all these arguments seem very persuasive, they have been fre-
quently questioned. Firstly, most illnesses can be seen as genetically-based so all 
such medical information about illnesses can be treated as genetic, irrespective 
of its source. Secondly, there are many sorts of information that have a predic-
tive ability, not only genetic information. For instance, health care history or the 
level of cholesterol provide some kind of prediction of a future health condition. 
Thirdly, health records can provide many personal details as well as some in-
formation about individual’s relatives. What is more, information about certain 
diseases based on non-genetic (e.g. environmental) conditions can be as impor-
tant for the family members (a spouse, offspring or siblings) as any genetic infor-
mation. It depends on a disease, not on a source of disease. Fourthly, there are 
many non-genetic factors relevant to an onset of a disease that are absolutely 
beyond our control – such as pollution, smoking parents or co-workers etc. In 
sum, we have to admit that it is extremely diffi cult to treat genetic informa-
tion as something separate from medical data, even though it does not mean 
that genetic information does not require special protection. When we challenge 
the descriptive assumption of genetic exceptionalism it does not undermine the 
normative assumption. We can still argue that genetic information ought to be 
specially protected as if they were distinctive. However, any regulation based 
on these assumptions may be ineffi cient in practice because of all the diffi cul-
ties concerned with distinguishing genetic information and the ambiguity of its 
defi nition. Therefore, I would like to consider another approach to the problem of 
genetic discrimination which turns back to the initially invoked problem of the 
justifi ed and unjustifi ed criteria of different treatment.      
When genetic features are unjustified criteria of different treatment 
– challenging genetic determinism 
The debate over genetic non-discrimination acts goes into blind alley when 
it is focused on the question of whether information is genetic or non-genetic. 
Instead it should be focused on its character and on the use of information, espe-
cially on its context. 
It is worth mentioning that both sides of the debate – those who argue against 
and those who argue for genetic non-discrimination acts – usually share the faith 
in genes and the ability of genetic information to reveal our fate. The former ar-
gue that individuals who are different in their genetic predispositions and he-
redity cannot be treated alike with respect to their insurance system since such 
features are relevant to the aims of the distribution of health or life insurance. 
The latter, on the other hand, argue that since genetic features are not a matter 
of people’s choice they cannot be the justifi ed criteria of the distribution of health 
or life insurance. The problem of both lines of argumentation lies in that they 
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ignore the fact that genetic information cannot solely determine people’s life and 
health condition, however its predictive value can be very strong. 
Genetic determinism (essentialism or reductionism) is a belief that genes de-
termine human beings and their life.26 It is a position that neglects all other rele-
vant and important information about human beings such as environmental and 
social conditions, as well as individual free will and the ability to make refl ec-
tive judgments, and reduces a human being to her genes only. To challenge this 
statement, “we should give genes their due, but no more than that” as Thomas 
Murray puts it.27 Genetic determinism is not only a cause of misunderstandings 
in the debate over genetic non-discrimination acts. It is also the main source of 
public fear of genetic discrimination and stigmatization. Therefore, I claim that 
the fundamental argument in favour of genetic non-discrimination acts is that 
they are (or ought to be) aimed at challenging genetic determinism. Since nobody 
should be reduced to her genetic features, differentiation in treatment based 
solely on genetic information about genes for the condition of disease is unjus-
tifi ed. Laws protecting genetic privacy and prohibiting genetic discrimination 
should be based on the fundamental assumption that having a gene for a condi-
tion is something different from having the condition. Thus, a healthy individual 
who has a predisposition or susceptibility for a disease cannot be treated on a par 
with an already ill individual who has developed the symptoms of a disease. It 
would be discriminatory since individuals who are different in some relevant 
respects ought to be treated differently. 
Nevertheless, it does not exclude the use of genetic information as the criteria 
of distribution of goods (including insurance or employment) when they are rel-
evant to the aim of distribution. If we accept that the insurance system is based 
on probability measures and the estimation of future risks, we should admit 
that actuarial methods can provide justifi ed criteria of different treatment of ap-
plicants. Therefore, the increased likelihood of using health care services among 
individuals who are in a group at higher risk of the development of a disease 
could justify their different treatment by insurers and it should not matter if the 
estimation of risk is based on genetic test results or family health care history. 
Yet if there are no such actuarial justifi cations, people with a predisposition or 
susceptibility for a disease cannot be treated different from other asymptomatic 
healthy individuals. In other words, the analyses of justifi ed and unjustifi ed cri-
teria of distribution of insurance should take into account distinction of informa-
tion with regard to their predictive value and their statistic correlation to risk 
and laws prohibiting genetic discrimination should be focused on challenging the 
idea of genetic determinism and on highlighting the signifi cance in the distinc-
tion between asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals as well as between the 
diagnosis and prognosis of a disease. 
Last but not least, considering the problem of discrimination in the insurance 
system we have to take into account the aim of the distribution. The main aim of 
insurance companies is to maximize their profi ts. The main aim of applicants, on 
the other hand, is to enable their access to health services or to guarantee their 
26  P.G. Epps, op.cit., p. 956.
27  T.H. Murray, op.cit., p. 70.
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family members fi nancial support when the  main wage earner in the household 
dies. Legislators and state policies have to weigh the interests of all parties and 
to pursue the main aim of the health care which is promotion of public health and 
guaranteeing of appropriate treatment or prediction of diseases among people. 
To realize this aim, legislators should adopt laws that would encourage people to 
perform genetic testing and screening and ensure the use of genetic information 
for the improvement of public health condition. This is one of the greatest chal-
lenges to health care policies in the age of genomic medicine. 
Concluding remarks
Genomic medicine places us in a position of signifi cant moral choices and 
poses many legal challenges. It is diffi cult to distinguish between information 
derived from genetic tests and information obtained from other medical data. 
Thus, it is diffi cult to maintain the exceptional protection of genetic information. 
Nevertheless, the special and wide ranging protection of patient’s rights and pri-
vacy is highly required. In my opinion, such protection should be understood as 
part of a broader project of human and patient’s rights protection and interpreted 
in their perspective. The main goal of any legislations with respect to the subject 
of genetic discrimination is to fi nd the balance between individual rights (that 
address such crucial ethical notions as individual autonomy, integrity, privacy, 
confi dentiality, human identity and dignity, moral equality), insurance compa-
nies’ interests and the community’s interests in promoting public health. Taking 
it into account, one should always remember that new advances in medicine are 
supposed to bring us new hopes for better treatment and open new perspectives 
for future health care. For people who undergo genetic testing and discover the 
fact that they are at risk of a disease it seems to be a cruel paradox when such 
information is used not in order to prevent the onset of disease but in order 
to refuse them the possibility to undergo special treatment. They suffer fi rstly 
from having a predisposition or susceptibility to disease and secondly from being 
excluded from or limited in their treatment. This is exactly the situation which 
brings about the public fear of genetic testing or screening that is an obstacle for 
further genetic research and further progress in genomic medicine. Law is an 
instrument by which we can challenge the problem and promote sensitivity to 
individual rights in public health care polices.
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